Defection and extortion as unexpected catalysts of unconditional cooperation in structured populations by Szolnoki, Attila & Perc, Matjaž
Defection and extortion as unexpected
catalysts of unconditional cooperation in
structured populations
Attila Szolnoki1 & Matjazˇ Perc2,3
1Institute of Technical Physics and Materials Science, Research Centre for Natural Sciences, Hungarian Academy of Sciences, P.O.
Box 49, H-1525 Budapest, Hungary, 2Department of Physics, Faculty of Natural Sciences and Mathematics, University of Maribor,
Korosˇka cesta 160, SI-2000 Maribor, Slovenia, 3CAMTP – Center for Applied Mathematics and Theoretical Physics, University of
Maribor, Krekova 2, SI-2000 Maribor, Slovenia.
We study the evolution of cooperation in the spatial prisoner’s dilemma game, where besides unconditional
cooperation and defection, tit-for-tat, win-stay-lose-shift and extortion are the five competing strategies.
While pairwise imitation fails to sustain unconditional cooperation and extortion regardless of game
parametrization,myopic updating gives rise to the coexistence of all five strategies if the temptation to defect
is sufficiently large or if the degree distribution of the interaction network is heterogeneous. This
counterintuitive evolutionary outcome emerges as a result of an unexpected chain of strategy invasions.
Firstly, defectors emerge and coarsen spontaneously among players adopting win-stay-lose-shift. Secondly,
extortioners and players adopting tit-for-tat emerge and spread via neutral drift among the emerged
defectors. And lastly, among the extortioners, cooperators become viable too. These recurrent evolutionary
invasions yield a five-strategy phase that is stable irrespective of the system size and the structure of the
interaction network, and they reveal the most unexpected mechanism that stabilizes extortion and
cooperation in an evolutionary setting.
W
idespread cooperation in nature is one of the most important challenges to Darwin’s theory of
evolution and natural selection, but it is also themain driving force behind the evolutionary transitions
that led from single-cell organisms to complex animal and human societies1. And it appears to be this
mixture of a fascinating riddle and outmost importance that makes cooperation so irresistibly attractive to study.
Evolutionary game theory2–6 is thereby the most frequently employed theoretical framework, revealing mechan-
isms such as kin selection7, network reciprocity8, direct and indirect reciprocity9,10, as well as group selection11 as
potent promoters of cooperative behavior. Adding to these established five rules for the evolution of coopera-
tion12, recent years have witnessed a surge of predominantly interdisciplinary studies, linking together knowledge
from biology, sociology, economics as well as mathematics and physics, to identify new ways by means of which
the successful evolution of cooperation amongst selfish and unrelated individuals can be understood13–20.
From the large array of games that make up evolutionary game theory, none has received as much attention as
the prisoner’s dilemma game21–35. Each instance of the game is contested by two players who have to decide
simultaneously whether they want to cooperate or defect. The dilemma is given by the fact that although mutual
cooperation yields the highest collective payoff, a defector will do better if the opponent decides to cooperate. The
rational outcome is thus mutual defection. The popularity of the game was helped significantly by the tourna-
ments that were organized by Robert Axelrod36, where the most successful strategy for the iterated prisoner’s
dilemma game was sought. Interestingly the long-term winner was the tit-for-tat strategy by the simple and
intuitive virtue of always following the opponent’s previous action. However, tit-for-tat cannot correct erroneous
moves, and it is also vulnerable to random drift when mutant strategies appear which always cooperate37. Nowak
and Sigmund therefore proposed win-stay-lose-shift as another equally simple strategy that has neither of these
two disadvantages, and can outperform tit-for-tat in the prisoner’s dilemma game22. Players adopting win-stay-
lose-shift simply repeat the previous move if the resulting payoff has met their aspiration level and change
otherwise.
The simplicity and effectiveness of strategies like tit-for-tat and win-stay-lose-shift were unrivaled for decades,
and they generated a large following of the seminal works that introduced them. Recently, however, Press and
Dyson have introduced a new class of so-called zero-determinant strategies that can dominate any opponent in
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the iterated prisoner’s dilemma game38. A particularly interesting
subset of the class are extortion strategies, which ensure that an
increase in one’s own payoff exceeds the increase in the other player’s
payoff by a fixed percentage. Extortion is therefore able to dominate
any opponent39. But this holds only if players are unable to change
strategies in response to their failures. In an evolutionary setting,
where players are able to imitate strategies that are more successful,
extortion was shown to be evolutionary unstable40. If the two players
engaged in the game belong to distinct populations, or if the popu-
lation size is very small, on the other hand, extortioners can never-
theless prevail, and rather counterintuitively, they may also act as
catalysts for the evolution of cooperation41. Evolutionary stability can
also be warranted by generous zero-determinant strategies through
their mutually supporting behavior42.
Results summarized thus far concerning zero-determinant strat-
egies were obtained in well-mixed populations. Yet it is well-
known that stable solutions in structured population can differ
significantly from those in well-mixed populations. The most
prominent example of this fact is the successful evolution of coop-
eration in the spatial prisoner’s dilemma game through network
reciprocity8. Further examples include the stabilization of reward43,
peer and pool punishment44,45, in-group favoritism46, as well as
homophily47, to name but a few. Indeed, the fact that the interac-
tions among players are frequently not random and best described
by a well-mixed model, but rather that they are limited to a set of
other players in the population and as such are best described by a
network, has far-reaching consequences for the outcome of evolu-
tionary processes13,15,16,18,19.
Motivated by this, we have recently shown that in structured
populations themicroscopic dynamic that governs strategy updating
plays a decisive role for the fate of extortioners48. By using the sim-
plest three-strategy model, comprising cooperators (C), defectors
(D), and extortioners (Ex), we have shown that pairwise imitation
and birth-death dynamics return the same evolutionary outcomes as
reported previously in well-mixed populations. The usage of myopic
best response strategy updating, on the other hand, renders extortion
evolutionary stable via neutral drift. Counterintuitively, the stability
of extortioners helps cooperators to survive even under the most
testing conditions, whereby the neutral drift of Ex players serves as
the entry point, akin to a Trojan horse, for cooperation to grab a hold
among defectors. Although the mutually rewarding checkerboard-
like coexistence of cooperators and extortioners can always be tem-
porarily disturbed by defectors, it is only a matter of time before the
neutral drift reintroduce extortioners and the whole cycle starts
anew.
Here we extend our study to five competing strategies, taking
into account also the tit-for-tat strategy (TFT) and the win-stay-
lose-shift strategy (WSLS), in addition to the previous three that
we have studied in48. The five strategies D, C, Ex, TFT, and WSLS
are the same as studied recently by Hilbe et al.41 in well-mixed
populations, with the strength of the social dilemma b and the
strength of exploitation x being the two main parameters that
determine the payoffs amongst the strategies. For details about
the parametrization of the game and the applied updating rules,
we refer to the Methods section. The inclusion of the tit-for-tat
strategy and the win-stay-lose-shift strategy promises fascinating
evolutionary outcomes, especially since under well-mixed condi-
tions D can beat WSLS, but the dominance reverses in the pre-
sence of the other three strategies. As we will show in the next
Section, in structured populations WSLS dominate completely for
sufficiently small values of b if the interaction network is charac-
terized by a homogeneous degree distribution. Beyond a threshold
value of b, or if the interaction network is characterized by a
heterogeneous degree distribution (see for example49), however,
D emerge and coarsen spontaneously, which in turn opens up
the possibility for all the other strategies to emerge as well.
Results
Before turning to the main results obtained with myopic best res-
ponse updating, we present in Fig. 1 the evolutionary outcomes
obtained via imitation on a square lattice. If imitation is the basis
of strategy updating, then neither cooperators nor extortioners can
survive, and this regardless of the strength of the social dilemma and
the strength of exploitation. Since extortioners always die out, the
composition of the final state is actually completely independent of x.
We have used x 5 1.5 for the presented results, but the value influ-
ences only the time needed for relaxation towards the final stable
solution. Starting with b$ 1 (we show results from b5 1.5 onwards
for clarity with regards to the subsequent phase transitions), the
completely dominant strategy isWSLS. At the other end of the inter-
val of b, we have a stable three-strategy WSLS 1 TFT 1 D phase,
which is sustained by cyclic dominance. In between, we have a nar-
row two-strategy WSLS 1 D phase, which terminates immediately
after D reach dominance.
This dependence on b can be understood by considering the rela-
tions among the surviving strategies, as summarized in the bottom
frame of Fig. 1. For small values of b (left), WSLS dominate both D
and TFT. The latter also dominateD, but their superior status in this
relationship has no effect on the final state. For high values of b
(right), the direction of invasion between WSLS and D changes
compared to the low b case, while the other two relations remain
unchanged. Consequently, instead of a pureWSLS phase, we have a
three-strategy WSLS 1 TFT 1 D phase, where WSLS invade TFT,
TFT invadeD, andD invadeWSLS to close the loop of dominance. It
is worth emphasizing that this solution is impossible in a well-mixed
population for all b , 2.
In a narrow interval between the pureWSLS phase and the cyclic
WSLS 1 TFT 1 D phase, we have the situation depicted in the
middle of the bottom frame of Fig. 1, where unlike for small and
high values of b, the relation between WSLS and D enables their
coexistence in a structured population. As for small values of b, here
too TFT can invadeD, but this is without effect on the final outcome.
Figure 1 | Imitation on a square lattice fails to sustain cooperation and
extortion. Depicted are the stationary frequencies of surviving strategies in
dependence on the strength of the social dilemma b. It can be observed that
for sufficiently small values of b onlyWSLS survive. As b increases, the pure
WSLS phase first gives way to a narrow two-strategy WSLS 1 D phase,
which then transforms into the three-strategyWSLS1 TFT1D phase. The
emergence of these three different phases is a direct consequence of
dominance relations between the three involved strategies, which are
schematically depicted in the bottom frame for the respective values of b
from left to right. Arrows show the direction of invasion between strategies.
www.nature.com/scientificreports
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The stable two-strategy coexistence is illustrated in Fig. 2, where we
show how WSLS and D compete for space over time for different
values of b. The larger the value of b, the smaller the fraction of the
population that is occupied by WSLS in the stationary state.
Interestingly, when b is large enough for D to fully eliminate
WSLS, the complete dominance of defectors is prevented by the
presence of TFT, who become viable via a second-order continuous
phase transition. From this point onwards, the cyclic dominance
WSLS R TFT R D R WSLS starts working until the end of the
interval of b, as depicted in the main panel of Fig. 1.
Overall, extortion is unable to capitalize on structured interactions
if the strategy updating is governed by imitation or a birth-death rule
(results not shown), and in fact this is in full qualitative agreement
with the results obtained in well-mixed populations40,41. In the realm
of evolutionary games, extortioners do not do well against coopera-
tive strategies like C, TFT and WSLS. They may thrive for a short
period of time, but as soon extortion becomes widespread, it is more
profitable to cooperate, which ultimately renders extortion evolu-
tionary unstable.
Myopic strategy updating, on the other hand, can sustain very
different evolutionary outcomes as it allows players to adopt strat-
egies that are not necessarily present in their interaction neighbor-
hood. In fact, strategies need not be present in the population at all, as
long as they are an option for the players to choose randomly when it
is their turn to perhaps change their strategy. Nevertheless, we
emphasize that myopic best response updating is different from
mutation, because each individual strategy change is still driven by
the payoff difference, as described by Eq. 1. Results presented in Fig. 3
obtained on the square lattice (top) and the random regular graph
(middle) show that for sufficiently small values of b the final state is
the same as under imitation dynamics. Players adoptingWSLS dom-
inate completely from b5 1 onwards (as in Fig. 1, we show results for
b $ 1.5 only). At a critical value of b, however, a second-order
continuous phase transition rather unexpectedly leads to the stable
coexistence of all five competing strategies. A similar diversity of
strategies prevails on heterogeneous interaction networks, as illu-
strated by the results obtained on a scale-free network shown in
the bottom panel of Fig. 3. Myopic best response updating is thus
able to stabilize extortion in structured populations. Perhaps even
more surprisingly, as the strength of the social dilemma increases, the
two cooperative strategiesC andTFT become viable as well. This out-
come is rather independent of the structure of the interaction network.
Since extortioners survive for sufficiently high values of b, the
strength of extortion x might play a role too, but as evidenced by
the results presented in Fig. 4, this role is in fact very minor. As the
value of x increases, the extortioners become slightly more common
on the expense of TFT and C players, but overall this does not affect
the evolutionary stability of extortion and cooperation. Compared to
our previous results presented in48, where we have studied the three
strategy variant of the game without TFT andWSLS players, the role
of x is less significant heremainly because the stationary frequency of
extortioners is much smaller. The fact that their frequency is much
smaller, however, is a direct consequence of the presence of the two
additional cooperative strategies (TFT and WSLS), which in turn
highlights the general subordinate role of extortioners compared to
cooperation in evolutionary games. The latter was emphasized
already in40,41, as well as by the results presented in Fig. 1 above.
Also contributing to the minor role of x is that the emergence of
extortioners is in fact a second-order effect, as we will explain next.
To understand why Ex, TFT and C emerge as b increases, it is
instructive to consider the erosion of the pureWSLS phase on square
lattice, as illustrated in Fig. 5. For a sufficiently high value of b defec-
tors emerge and start coarsen spontaneously because their payoff
becomes competitive with the payoff of aggregated WSLS players.
The emergence of theD phase, however, paves the way for the emer-
gence of all the other strategies. Namely, both Ex and TFT are neutral
against D, and thus they may emerge by chance and spread via
neutral drift. As Ex accumulate locally, C become viable too because
their payoff is higher. The emergence of C is helped further (or at
least not hindered) by TFT, who are neutral with C. During this
unexpected chain of strategy invasions, defection and extortion thus
emerge as catalysts of unconditional cooperation. Effectively, the
defectors act as a Trojan horse for all the other strategies, while
subsequently the extortioners act as a Trojan horse for cooperation.
Evidently, the spreading of C, which utilizes the neutral drift of Ex,
will be controlled by defectors andWSLS players who can strike back
since their presence in place of an extortioner may yield a higher
payoff in a predominantly cooperative neighborhood. This, however,
will again be only temporary, since the described elementary inva-
sions are bound to recur, thus assuring the stability of the five-
strategy WSLS 1 D 1 Ex 1 TFT 1 C phase.
An important lesson learned from the presented results in Fig. 5 is
that although extortion can be as counterproductive as defection, it is
still less destructive. For an unconditional cooperator it never pays
stickingwith the strategy if surrounded by defectors, but itmay be the
best option among extortioners. Cooperators are of course happiest
among other cooperators, but in the presence of extortioners they
can still attain a positive payoff, and this is much better than nothing
or a negative value in the presence of defectors. It is worth emphas-
izing that this argument is valid independently of the properties of
the interaction network, as the described chain of strategy invasions
emerges in all the structured populations that we have considered.
Discussion
We have shown that even if the set of competing strategies is
extended to encompass, besides unconditional cooperators, defec-
tors and extortioners48, also the tit-for-tat strategy and the win-stay-
lose-shift strategy, the imitation dynamics in structured populations
is still unable to render extortion evolutionary stable. For sufficiently
small values of b only players adopting the win-stay-lose-shift strat-
egy survive, while beyond a threshold value a stable three-strategy
phase consisting of defectors, tit-for-tat and win-stay-lose-shift
players emerges. Since extortioners never survive, the strength of
exploitation x is without effect. These results agree with those
reported previously for sizable isolated well-mixed populations41,
and they highlight the severe challenges that extortioners face when
Figure 2 | The coexistence of defectors and players adopting the win-stay-
lose-shift strategy in case of imitation on a square lattice. Depicted is the
time evolution of the frequency of defectors fD as obtained for b 5 1.7,
1.734, 1.736, 1.738, 1.739 and 1.741 from bottom to top. The time courses
provide insight into the competition for space within the narrow two-
strategyWSLS 1 D phase that can be observed in Fig. 1. At b 5 1.741
defectors come to dominate the whole population, but their dominance is
immediately overthrown in favor of the three-strategyWSLS 1 TFT 1 D
phase that is sustained by cyclic dominance. The used linear size of the
square lattice is L 5 1000. Note that the time scale is logarithmic.
www.nature.com/scientificreports
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vying for survival in the realm of evolutionary games where players
are able to imitate strategies that are performing better40.
If the evolution is governed by myopic best response updating,
however, the outcomes are significantly different from those
obtained via imitation. We have shown that for sufficiently large
values of b the complete dominance of win-stay-lose-shift players
is broken as soon as defectors emerge and start coarsening.
Subsequently, within the homogeneous domains of defectors, extor-
tion becomes viable too via the same mechanism as we have
described before in48. In particular, extortioners and defectors are
neutral, and hence the former can emerge by chance and spread
via neutral drift. Yet as soon as extortioners emerge, cooperators
can finally emerge as well, because in competition with the former
they are superior. In this evolutionary scenario, defection and extor-
tion thus act as the most surprising catalysts of unconditional coop-
eration in structured populations. Moreover, we have shown that the
coexistence of all competing strategies occurs across the whole inter-
val of b values if a heterogeneous (scale-free) network describes the
interactions among players. Because of this unlikely path towards
cooperation, we conclude that defectors and extortioners effectively
play the role of a Trojan horse for cooperators. Interestingly, similar
transient roles of extortionate behavior were recently reported in the
realm of well-mixed populations when studying the adaptive
dynamics of extortion and compliance50. Moreover, after the emer-
gence and coarsening of defectors, in the presently studied game the
tit-for-tat players also become viable as they are likewise neutral, and
can thus spread via neutral drift just like extortioners. In recurrence,
these evolutionary processes give rise to a stable five-strategy phase
Figure 4 | The strength of extortion has a negligible impact on the
stationary frequencies of competing strategies, and it does not affect the
evolutionary stability of extortion and cooperation. Depicted are the
stationary frequencies of surviving strategies in dependence on the
strength of extortion x, as obtained for the social dilemma strength b5 2
on a square lattice. It can be observed that the variations of all frequencies
are small. Expectedly, larger values of x favor extortion. The neutral drift of
TFT players therefore becomes slightly less prolific, which in turn also
slightly decreases the frequency of cooperators. Interestingly, the
stationary frequencies of strategies at b 5 2 and their x-dependency are
practically indistinguishable for the square lattice and the random regular
graph. This further highlights the irrelevance of the structure of the
interaction network under myopic best response updating, and thus also
the universality of the presented results.
Figure 3 | Myopic best response updating in structured populations
stabilizes extortion and cooperation. Depicted are the stationary
frequencies of surviving strategies in dependence on the strength of the
social dilemma b, as obtained for the strength of extortion x5 1.5 on the
square lattice (top), the random regular graph (middle), and the scale-free
network (bottom). It can be observed that players adopting theWSLS
strategy dominate for sufficiently small values of b on homogeneous
interaction networks (top and middle), but as b increases or if the
interaction network is heterogeneous (bottom), the pureWSLS phase gives
way to a stable five-strategy WSLS 1 D 1 Ex 1 TFT 1 C phase. Here
defectors emerge and coarsen spontaneously because for sufficiently large
values of b their payoff becomes larger than that of clusteredWSLS players.
The emergence of defectors immediately opens the door to the survival of
extortioners and TFT players, which both emerge by chance and spread by
means of neutral drift. Lastly, with the emergence of extortioners and TFT
players cooperators become viable as well, thus forming the stable five-
strategy phase. The latter is virtually unaffected by different values of x, as
demonstrated in Fig. 4. Importantly, the described coexistence of the
competing strategies is a universal behavior that can be observed in
structured populations regardless of the properties of the interaction
network, and even across the whole span of b values, as illustrated in the
bottom panel. Characteristic snapshots depicting the described key stages
of the evolutionary process are presented in Fig. 5.
www.nature.com/scientificreports
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that is hardly affected by the strength of exploitation x, and it is also
robust to the population size and the structure of the interaction
network.
Taken together, these results thus have a high degree of universal-
ity and highlight the relevance of coarsening, the emergence of role-
separating strategy distributions (which manifests as checkerboard
ordering on regular graphs), and best response updating in evolu-
tionary games. The latter is especially important, as it appears to be
an integral part of human behavior51–53. From the more pragmatical
point of view, best response updating conveys to the players an ability
to explore the space of available strategies even if they are not present
in their immediate neighborhood or even in the population as a
whole, and by doing so, such updating dynamics opens up the door
to the most counterintuitive evolutionary outcomes. Similarly to kin
competition, the presented results also highlight the other side of
network reciprocity. Namely, it does not only support cooperative
behavior by means of clustering, but it also reveals the consequences
of bad decisions – defectors and extortioners becomeweakwhen they
become surrounded by their like. From this point of view, it is under-
standable and indeed expected that structured populations, if any-
thing, hinder the successful evolution of extortion under imitation.
The surprising positive role of extortioners becomes apparent only
under best response updating, where the threatening loom of wide-
spread defection is drifted away by the lesser evil to eventually intro-
duce more constructive cooperative strategies.
Methods
We adopt the same game parametrization as Hilbe et al.41. Accordingly, the payoff
matrix for the five competing strategies is
TFT WSLS Ex all C all D
TFT
1
2
1
2
0 1 0
WSLS
1
2
1
2b{1ð Þx
3b{2z 3b{1ð Þx
bz1
2
1{b
2
Ex 0
2b{1ð Þx
3b{2z 3b{1ð Þx 0
2b{1ð Þx
b{1zbx
0
all C 1
2{b
2
2b{1
b{1zbx
1 1{ b
all D 0
b
2
0 b 0
where b is the benefit to the other player provided by each cooperator at the cost c, and
x determines the surplus of the extortioner in relation to the surplus of the other
player. Moreover, we use b 2 c 5 1, thus having b . 1 and x . 1 as the two main
parameters. The former determines the strength of the social dilemma,while the latter
determines just how strongly strategy Ex exploits cooperators. A direct comparison of
the extortioner strategy with the other strategies reveals that Ex is neutral with
unconditional defectors and players adopting the TFT strategy. The latter, however,
may beat Ex if they are surrounded by other TFT players. Similar relations hold for the
competition between Ex andWSLS players. While the latter receive the same income
from a direct interaction, they do gain more if the neighbors also adopt the WSLS
strategy. It is also worth noting that the payoffs between C and D constitute the
so-called donation game, which is an important special case of the iterated prisoner’s
dilemma game with all the original properties retained54.
We predominantly consider a L 3 L square lattice with periodic boundary con-
ditions as the simplest interaction network to describe a structured population. To
demonstrate the robustness of our findings, we also use a random regular graph and
the scale-free network with the same average degree, which is likely somewhat more
apt to describe realistic social and technological networks55.We have used population
sizes from 104 up to 106 players to avoid finite-size effects.
Unless stated differently, for example to illustrate a specific invasion process as in
Fig. 5, we use random initial conditions such that all five strategies are uniformly
distributed across the network.We carry outMonte Carlo simulations comprising the
following elementary steps. First, a randomly selected player x with strategy sx
acquires its payoff px by playing the game with its k neighbors, as specified by the
underlying interaction network. Next, player x changes its strategy sx to s’x with the
probability
q s’x?sxð Þ~ 1
1zexp px{p’x
 
K
  ð1Þ
where p’x is the payoff of the same player if adopting strategy s’x within the same
neighborhood, and K 5 0.05 quantifies a small uncertainty that is related to the
strategy adoption process15. The strategy s’x should of course be different from sx, and
it is drawn randomly from the remaining four strategies. Such strategy updating is
known as the myopic best response rule51.
We also consider the more traditional strategy imitation, where player x imitates
the strategy of a randomly selected neighbor y, only that p’x in Eq. 1 is replaced by py15,
as well as death-birth updating as described for example in56. Regardless of the applied
strategy updating rule, we let the system evolve towards the stationary state where the
average frequency of strategies becomes time independent. We measure time in full
Monte Carlo steps (MCS), during which each player is given a chance to change its
strategy once on average.
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